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Aló and Cançado’s (this issue) primary argument is that motivation should be 
described in terms of an intervening variable. Furthermore, they raise secondary 
points concerning the status and usage of technical terms and the scope of the 
motivational concept in behavior analysis. We agree with Aló and Cançado that 
a clear definition of motivation is essential. However, we disagree with their 
analysis on a number of fundamental points, such as the correct use of technical 
terms, the range of phenomena that should be considered as motivational, and 
we argue that the concept of the intervening variable is incompatible with radical 
behaviorism. We contend that motivation is best conceptualized as factors that 
influence the rate of operant responding but that are not part of the operant 
contingency and that, as with the term reinforcement, the terms operation and 
process are useful distinctions that should be employed.
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Aló and Cançado (this issue) make the case that the concept of motivation is best 
described in terms of an intervening variable. Although we agree with some aspects of Aló 
and Cançado’s arguments, such as the need to have a clear definition of motivation, we 
disagree with their analysis on a number of fundamental points. In this commentary, we 
stress the importance of using of technical terms correctly, we discuss what phenomena 
should be considered as motivational, and we argue that the concept of the intervening 
variable has no place in radical behaviorism. We contend that motivation is best 
conceptualized as factors that influence the rate of operant responding but that are not part 
of the operant contingency (Whelan & Barnes- Holmes, 2010). That is, the value of the 
consequences should be described in terms of the level of responding that occurs relative 
to some previously measured baseline and that, as with the term of reinforcement, the 
terms operation and process should be employed.
terminological Issues
Correct use of technical terms
According to Catania (1969), “the vocabulary of reinforcement includes at least three 
nouns: reinforcer as a stimulus, reinforcement as an operation, and reinforcement as a 
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process or as a relationship between an operation and a process” (p. 845). As an operation, 
reinforcement is the delivery of a reinforcer; as a process, it is the increase in responding 
produced by the operation. Thus, Catania argued for a clear distinction between operation 
and process. In contrast, Aló and Cançado suggest that distinguishing clearly between 
operation and process may be problematic because “given the strength of verbal traditions in 
behavior analysis . . . this may be difficult to implement” (p. 646). Furthermore, they write 
that “even though the de facto approach in behavior analysis is to differentiate between 
operations and processes, the same term is frequently used to refer to both”—for example, 
reinforcement, punishment, and extinction. However, we disagree fundamentally with Aló 
and Cançado on this point: Using inaccurate scientific terms, or using terms loosely, cannot 
be justified simply because such practices have been employed in the past. Distinctions 
between operations and processes are well established in behavior analysis, perhaps even to 
the extent that they can be considered axiomatic. Indeed, we believe that it is useful to keep 
an explicit distinction between operation and process because it helps to avoid confusion due 
to the circular nature of the definition of reinforcement (see Catania, 1969, p. 846).
two terms, but one Concept
Aló and Cançado write, in relation to our conceptualization of motivation in terms of 
operation and process, that “the adoption of two new terms to refer to motivational variables 
based on the argument that operations and processes need to be explicitly differentiated 
could call for the same differentiation regarding other behavior- analytic terms” (p. 646). We 
found this criticism puzzling, given that there would be no loss in parsimony: Behavior 
analysts already use the terms operation and process, notwithstanding the previous point 
regarding their misuse. Perhaps the issue simply involves the use of acronyms. Reinforcement, 
punishment, and extinction are long- established terms, and describing them in terms of 
operation and process is well established. We assigned the acronyms CVO and CVP to 
consequence- valuing operation and consequence- valuing process, respectively, to emphasize 
the operation/process distinction. Our use of acronyms was influenced by the previous use of 
acronyms in the motivational literature (e.g., EO, CEO, MO, etc.). Note, however, that 
endorsement of the acronyms CVO/CVP is not necessary for our concept of motivation; 
rather, the central notion is that motivation should be described in terms of a change in 
responding relative to some baseline, without the operant contingency being affected. Thus, 
when Aló and Cançado write that “the behavior- analytic community could be called to adopt 
two new terms to replace reinforcement” (p. 646), it is important to remember that the 
concept of reinforcement already encompasses both operation and process.
scope of the Concept: What phenomena are motivational?
definition by exclusion
Aló and Cançado write that defining motivation by exclusion—that is, by factors that 
are outside the operant contingency—is problematic for two reasons: first, because of the 
unaccounted effects of extraneous variables and second, because variables that are not part 
of the n- term contingency that affect responding may not necessarily be motivational. We 
deal with each of these points in turn.
First, “as the limits of this definition are loosely determined, the effects of extraneous 
variables could be inadvertently attributed to EOs” (p. 645). However, it is the 
experimenter’s role to isolate controlling variables to the extent that their effect on the 
target behavior is attributable to that variable. If a putative motivating variable is 
manipulated in a proper and systematic fashion, and the target behavior changes in 
accordance with that manipulation, then that variable was motivational. If the controlling 
variable was not clearly demonstrated, it is the experimenter’s “fault” and does not impinge 
upon the theoretical interpretation of motivation (whatever that may be). As an aside, it is 
worth noting that if one follows Aló and Cançado’s line of reasoning, in principle the 
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effects of noncontrolled or unknown variables could just as easily be attributed to 
discriminative stimuli in situations where experimental manipulations are not implemented 
in a careful and systematic fashion.
Second, Aló and Cançado write that definitions by exclusion—that is, “the idea that 
all events that are not part of Category X are necessarily a part of Category Y . . . may be 
dangerous” (p. 645). However, there are only two factors (or three, if we consider a 
combination of the first two) that can influence operant behavior: either consequences are 
more or less available, or they are more or less effective. In other words, what do Aló and 
Cançado propose as Category Z, a factor that influences operant behavior without affecting 
either consequence availability or effectiveness?
In a related vein, Aló and Cançado write that “this [Aló and Cançado’s] perspective 
also encourages the inclusion of procedures in applied settings that may not otherwise be 
defined as motivational, such as interventions in which rate, delay, and magnitude of 
reinforcers are manipulated” (p. 650) because “Mazur’s definition of value includes 
variables that are part of the n- term contingency” (p. 656). This is a clear point of 
difference between Aló and Cançado’s and our approach: Interventions affecting rate, 
delay, and magnitude of reinforcers should not be considered as motivational from our 
perspective. Including phenomena that regulate reinforcer availability rather than 
reinforcer effectiveness would seem to be contrary to the behavior- analytic concept of 
motivation (e.g., Catania, 1992; Skinner, 1953), and would likely lead to difficultly in 
isolating the source of the control over behavior.
Aló and Cançado also present a specific example (p. 646) of their thinking in this 
area:
An animal is exposed to a fixed- ratio (FR) schedule until stable, high- rate 
responding occurs. Then, a differential- reinforcement- of- low- rate (DRL) 
schedule replaces the FR schedule under the same discriminative stimulus, 
and response rates remain high during several sessions, even though 
reinforcement rates decrease significantly as a result. . . . Should the history 
under the FR schedule be considered motivational or consequence valuing, 
because it altered responding during the exposure to the DRL without 
changing the current contingencies arranged by the DRL schedule? Even 
though the FR history meets the criterion for defining a CVO, one could 
argue it should not be classified as motivational because it did not change the 
effectiveness of the consequence, but simply the probability that the animal 
would produce it.
It is important to note, however, that Whelan and Barnes- Holmes (2010) defined 
consequence valuing as change relative to a baseline measure, but in the previous example 
there is no change in response rate from baseline. Therefore, if there were no change in 
behavior, there were no motivational factors involved. As an aside, in the Cole (2001) 
study, responding rapidly decreased following the change of schedule, and Cole reported 
this effect as strong evidence for control by the immediate consequences of behavior. In 
this case, given a decrease in responding, we would not say that the effect was a CVP. 
Rather, factors within the operant contingency have been altered (i.e., the availability of 
the consequence) and hence this decrease in responding is not due to motivational factors.
designed versus naturally occurring Changes
Aló and Cançado write that “it seems that operations defined as motivational should 
include not only operations designed to alter the value of a consequence but also operations 
that happen without explicit manipulation (e.g., those in effect when a food- deprived 
animal forages in the wild)” (p. 646). They are correct that Whelan and Barnes- Holmes 
(2010) focused on behavior modification, that is, a focus on prediction and influence over 
behavior rather than a description of behavior. In the same way that the concept of 
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reinforcement is not necessarily restricted to explicit manipulations, our concept of 
consequence value is not necessarily restricted to operations designed to alter behavior. A 
common definition of an operation (here, for reinforcement) follows: “As an operation, 
reinforcement refers to the occurrence of a consequence subsequent to a behavior” (Cooper, 
Heron, & Heward, 1987, p. 257). Following Cooper et al.’s definition, we could describe the 
length of food deprivation as a consequence- valuing operation (i.e., length of deprivation 
does not make food differentially available, and foraging increases relative to some 
baseline). Nonetheless, we still strongly favor a definition of motivation that focuses on 
behavior change via explicit manipulation of environmental variables.
Conceptual Issues: status of an Intervening variable
Aló and Cançado write, “We propose that operations and processes are differentiated 
as independent and dependent variables that can be classified under the intervening 
variable value or consequence value” (p. 650) and that “consequence value would be 
nothing more than a name used when certain operations . . . produce certain behavioral 
effects” (p. 649). We believe that this approach is fundamentally incompatible with radical 
behaviorism, is not parsimonious, and is not pragmatic.
It is worth considering the history of the intervening variable and its important role in 
mediational neobehaviorism (Moore, 2010). In mediational behaviorism, unobservable 
meditational variables are allowed to bridge the gap between environment and response. 
That is, environmental variables affect unobservable internal variables (e.g., value), and 
these variables in turn affect responses. Therefore, understanding the nature of the 
mediational variable frequently becomes the primary focus of the analysis. The concept of 
the intervening variable was introduced so that concepts could be operationalized to be 
applied to a variety of situations. MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) described intervening 
variables as having only the properties of the empirical data of which they are an 
abstraction (in contrast, a hypothetical construct has unobserved properties beyond its 
public manifestations).
The concept of an intervening variable (e.g., value) with some quantitative properties 
has been criticized. For example, Moore (2008) has written that “to contend that some 
usage of a theoretical term such as ‘value’ in a quantitatively oriented theory is permissible 
because it is merely a theoretical construct, or that it is just an intervening variable, with 
no surplus meaning, rather than hypothetical construct, with surplus meaning is 
mischievous and deceptive” (p. 657). According to Moore, this is because distinguishing 
between terms such as intervening variable and hypothetical construct assumes a 
referential view of verbal behavior and requires the adoption of a position called 
epistemological dualism. Epistemological dualism holds that scientific knowledge is 
acquired through the manipulation of variables in another dimension. The intervening 
variable, therefore, is an event “taking place somewhere else, at some other level of 
observation, described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions” 
(Skinner, as cited in Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 88). Given that the intervening variable 
exists in a dimension removed from the target behavior and the environment in which it 
occurs, it is inefficient because it adds extra complexity without additional explanatory 
power. In contrast, describing consequence value in terms of operations and process allows 
us to focus on environment–behavior relations, and it is recognized that our scientific 
descriptions of these events are simply verbal behavior, which are subject to verbal 
contingencies. In effect, the use of a quantitative intervening variable diverts attention 
away from prediction and influence over behavior and toward a post hoc estimation of the 
value of the intervening variable.
Conclusion
Motivational factors play a key role in the scientific analysis of behavior, and it is 
therefore important that the behavior- analytic treatment of motivation (a) is consistent 
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with behavioral principles and (b) explains behavior–environment relations with no more 
explanatory concepts than are necessary. Our main objections to Aló and Cançado’s 
conceptualization of motivation as an intervening variable are that it is inconsistent with 
widely established behavior analytic principles and that it is not parsimonious. Rather, we 
argue that extant concepts of behavior analysis can be used to adequately describe 
motivational phenomena. That is, a comprehensive and efficient behavior- analytic 
approach to motivation is possible by isolating the environmental factors that influence 
responding, measuring any change in responding, and employing the useful terminological 
distinction between operation and process.
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